Abstract. This paper deals with two-person zero-sum rectangular games with random payoffs. It is assumed that each player knows the distribution functions of the random entries and that players must select their strategies before any observations of the random entries are made. In such a case, several models are considered and relations -among the optimal values are obtained. A special case, in which these random entries are linear functions of a random variable is also treated and some properties of the optimal strategies are given. In the final section, illustrative examples are shown.
where a (0 < a ~ 1) is selected in advance by player I and unknown to player 11. We denote the optimal value of 0 in (PI) with a fixed probability level a by 0 1 (a). The corresponding problem for player 11 is where a (0 < a ~ 1) is a pre-assigned probability level selected by player I and unknown to his opponent. The interpretation of (P3) is that player I seeks a strategy that gives him the greatest payoff level, while, at the same time, guaranteeing that the probability of his total payoff exceeding the payoff level is always bounded below by a, no matter what strategy his opponent may use. We denote the optimal value of 0 in (P3) with a fixed probability level a by 02(a). Correspondingly, player 11 seeks a strategy that gives him the least payoff level, while, at the same time, guaranteeing that the probability of his total payoff not exceeding the payoff level is always bounded below by S, no matter what strategy his opponent may use, i.e., the problem for player 11 is written as follows:
(P4) minimize y n yE ,n subject to T min X Prob [x Ay ~ n] ~ S, x£ where S (0 < S ~ 1) is chosen in advance by player II and unknown to player I.
We denote the optimal value of n in (P4) with a fixed probability level S by n 2 (S). In the probabi1ity-maximization problems by B1au, player I chooses a payoff level 0 and wishes to determine the maximum probability of his total payoff being bounded below by this level, independent of any strategy that his opponent may select. In mathematical terms, player I specifies 0 and solves Let a 2 (0) be the optimal probability level a in (P5) with a fixed payoff level o and let 8 2 (n) be the optimal probability level 8 in (P6) with a fixed payoff level n. Now, we establish other probabi1ity-·maximization models. Suppose that player I chooses a payoff level 0 which is unknown to player 11 and wishes to select a strategy which maximizes the probability of his minimum payoff being bounded below by 0 no matter what strategy player 11 may use. The minimization is taken within the probability operator, and hence, player I is preparing against the possibility that hjs opponent will choose the most damaging strategy for whatever realization of a .. may obtain. Thus, player I solves 
XE
We denote the optimal value of a in (P7) with a fixed payoff level 0 by a 1
and the optimal value of 13 in (P8) with a fixed payoff level n by 8 l (n).
In the above models, it is not necessarily assumed that the random variables a .. are mutually independent, although independence of the a .. is 1,J 1,J assumed in the papers by Blau [1] and Charnes et al [3] .
Relations among Models
In this section, we give several relations among the models in the preceding section.
Lemma 1. For any probability levels Ct and 13, and Proof: Let x* be an optimal strategy for (PI) with a probability level Proof: Let x* be an optimal strategy for (P3) with a probability level a and let y* be an optimal strategy for (P4) with a probability level 8. Then we have and thus,
Similarly, we get
and hence,
From (3) and (5), we obtain 02(a) ~ n 2 (S). This terminates our proof.
Two·Person Games u'ith Random Payo((s
The same type of proof as above establishes Corollary 1. Let the distribution functions of the a .. be strictly 2. Each a . . has the common scale paramel:er e > O. be dependent.
In fact, the random variables a . . may 
T. Kurisu
We shall use the following notation:
;:: As is well known, the optimal value of 0 in (PII) is equal to vl(l-ex, ex) and an optimal vector x for (PII) is a player I's optimal strategy for Gl(l-ex, ex) and the reverse is also true.
The following theorem gives a technique to obtain o~(ex) and an optimal strategy for (P3') with a probability level ex (> 0.5).
Theorem 2. If 0.5 < ex. then o~(ex) = vl(l-ex, ex) and player I's optimal strategies for the rectangular game Gl(l-'~. ex) are optimal strategies for (P3') with the probability level a. Since 0.5 < a,
and thus,
Therefore, we get for all y £ Y.
It follows, from (6) and (7), that x* and o~(a) are feasible for (PII), and hence, o~(a) ~ Vl(l-a, 11). On the other hand, i t is obvious that the optimal value of 0 for (PII) is less than or equal to o~(a), i.e., o~(a) ~ Vl(l-a, a).
Therefore, we get o~(a) = Vl(l-a, a), and so, player I's optimal strategies for Gl(l-a, a) are optimal strategies for (P3'). This terminates our proof.
When a > 0.5, Theorem 2 implies that o~(a) depends on the distribution for player 11 are often obvious analogues of those for player I, these analogues will not be stated when they are apparent.
T. Kurisu function of a. Theorem 3 implies that a* is the optimal probability level in (PS') with a payoff level 0 if and only if a* is the maximum root of the equation Vl(l-a, a) = o. Hence, in order to solve (PS'), it suffices to give a technique for finding the maximum root of a continuous decreasing function.
As there are many available techniques, we do not specify any details.
3.3. Optimal strategies for (Pl ') and (P2') Theorem 4. If there is an optimal strategy x* for (P3') with a probability level a such that x* E Xl UX 2 , then o!(a) = o~(a) and the x* is also an optimal strategy for (PI') with the probability level a.
Proof: Let x* be an optimal strategy for (P3') with a probability level a. Then we have (8) for all y E Y.
and hence, Therefore, for a y* such that 0 ~ y* ~ 1 -a.
We can get the same conclusion even if x' £ Xl V X 2
• Accordingly, we obtain cl*(a) = max O 1 Vl(y, a + y).
~y~ -a
The second equality of the theorem is proved by the similar method. This terminates our proof.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of the theorem.
Corollary 4. For any probability levels a and 8,
we ~et and hene-e,
.
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From (12), we further obtain
Now, (13) and (14) Thus, x* is an optimal strategy for (P7') with the payoff level 6. If x* € X 2 '
then the similar argument yields the samE' conclusion. This terminates our proof.
The following theorem is proved by the similar method as in Theorem 5.
Theorem 7. For any payoff levels /) and n. 
Examples
In this section, we give brief examples which illustrate some of the results in the preceding sections. Since (P3') with a = O.B is equivalent to the deterministic game The value of the game is 0.8000 and x' = (0.2764, 0.7236) is a player l's optimal strategy for the game. Hence, a:~(0.8) = 0.7236 and x' is an optimal strategy for (PS') with 0 = 0.8. Now, let us solve (P6') with n = 1. The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Prof. T. Nishida and Prof. M. Sakaguchi for their continuing guidances and encouragement. He wishes also to thank the referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
